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THE GREAT TURNING POINT: 
RELIGION AND RATIONALITY IN DOOYEWEERD'S 
TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE 
Lambert Zuidervaart 
Hugo Meynell objects to the apparent fideism and anti-foundationalism of 
Herman Dooyeweerd's philosophy. In response, my essay explicates the his-
torical setting and logical structure to Dooyeweerd's "transcendental critique 
of theoretical thought." His transcendental critique seeks to uncover the "reli-
gious root" of philosophy and of other academic disciplines. Given 
Dooyeweerd's notion of religion and his account of theoretical thought, I show 
that Meynell's criticisms are misplaced. Yet they point toward fundamental 
problems in Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique. Some problems pertain to 
the logic of Dooyeweerd's argument, and others to his notion of religion. I 
explain these problems and indicate how they should be addressed. 
The great turning point in my thought was ... the discovery of the religious root of 
thought itself. This shed a new light on the [continual] failure of all attempts, 
including my own, to bring about an inner synthesis between the Christian faith 
and a philosophy rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of human reason. 
-Herman Dooyeweerd' 
Faith and philosophy, two central themes for the Society of Christian 
Philosophers, drove the life work of Herman Dooyeweerd. Writing from 
Amsterdam in 1935, Dooyeweerd announces that his massive reconcep-
tualization of Western philosophy has not come without intense spiritu-
al struggle. "Originally," he says, "I was strongly under the influence 
first of the Neo-Kantian philosophy, later on of Husserl's phenomenolo-
gy" (NC l:v, WW 1:v).2 Then a great intellectual conversion occurred. 
The passage surrounding the epigraph above suggests that both conti-
nuity and discontinuity characterize the turn Dooyeweerd's thought 
took. On the one hand, Dooyeweerd continues the search for transcen-
dental conditions that make thought itself possible. He claims to have 
radicalized this search in a way that neither Kant nor Husserl could 
have allowed. Yet the search itself is a fundamentally Kantian enter-
prise. On the other hand, Dooyeweerd breaks with the commitment to 
rational autonomy that sustains transcendental philosophy from Kant 
through Husser!' He has discovered, he says, that thought itself has a 
"religious root," that human reason lacks "self-sufficiency," and that 
philosophical claims to the contrary sprout from a type of "faith" to 
which Christian faith cannot be successfully grafted. The source of his 
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discovery is a new appreciation of "the central significance of the 'heart,' 
repeatedly proclaimed by Holy Scripture to be the religious root of 
human existence" (NC l:v, WW l:v-vi). 
Many of the issues raised by Dooyeweerd's critics go back to his innova-
tive ,md complex articulations of this discovery. Early on the most vocal 
critics were Dutch theologians who perceived a threat to traditional 
Calvinism. They faulted Dooyeweerd and his close colleague D. H. Th. 
Vollenhoven for employing either insufficient or unorthodox theology in 
their philosophy. They especially objected to a philosophical anthropology 
whose emphasis on the heart radically recast the dislinction between body 
and souP When Dooyeweerd's writings began to circulate in the English-
speaking world,4 the dynamics of these criticisms, although not the precise 
details, recurred among fundamentalist Presbyterians5 and intellectualist 
Kuyperians6 at American colleges and seminaries. 
Catholic scholars in Europe also raised penetrating questions. The first 
of these was H. Robbers S.]., a Thomist professor of philosophy at the 
Catholic University of Nijmegen who reviewed all three volumes of De 
wijsbegeerte der wetsidee? Dooyeweerd responded in detail, and an extended 
discussion ensued over thirty years. The relations between nature and 
grace, between reason and revelation, and between Creator and creature 
were the central topics in their debates. In the 1950s M.F.]. Marlet S.]., a 
younger Thomist philosopher, began his own dialogue, with a dissertation 
published in German for which Dooyeweerd wrote an enthusiastic fore-
word.8 Marlet demonstrates much greater affinity with Dooyeweerd's 
thought than does Robbers, and he tries to rescue Thomas Aquinas from 
Dooyeweerd's criticisms by giving Aquinas a more personalist interpreta-
tion. While seeking to accommodate Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the reli-
gious roots of philosophy and the fundamental dependence of creation on 
God, Marlet retains the classic Thomist formulation of nature and grace 
and the notion of "being" as encompassing both Creator and creature. In 
response, Dooyeweerd questions the accuracy of Marlet's reading of 
Aquinas. Dooyeweerd also rejects any metaphysical concept of being that 
includes both God and creatures, as well as any Aristotelian concept of 
substance that disguises creatures' dependence on God.9 
TIle most thorough discussions of Dooyeweerd's "discovery," and its 
implications for philosophy and culture, have come from other reforma-
tional philosophers. lIl These range from debates benveen Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven concerning the nature of the human heart to criticisms from 
Dooyeweerd's younger colleagues and students directed at his accounts of 
transcendental criticism, "theoretical thought," and the relation between 
faith and religion. ll Indeed, the first dissertations written in English about 
Dooyeweerd regard faith-oriented transcendental critique as both the gen-
erative core to his project and a crucial source of unresolved problems.12 
It is not surprising, then, that similar themes surface in Hugo Meynell's 
"transcendental Thomist appraisal" of Dooyeweerd's philosophy. Because 
so much has already been written on these themes, however, and because 
many readers of this journal are unfamiliar with Dooyeweerd's own writ-
ings, it is not obvious how a reformational philosopher should respond to 
Meynell's appraisal. Also, in answering a wide range of different critics, 
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Dooyeweerd significantly changed his approach to transcendental critique. 
So one has ample potential for communicative disaster. Perhaps I should 
begin with the contours and changes to Dooyeweerd's own conception. 
Then I shall defend Dooyeweerd from several of Professor Meynell's criti-
cisms. Since his criticisms also call attention to problems in Dooyeweerd's 
conception, however, I shall conclude by identifying these problems and 
indicating how they should be addressed. 
1. Two Conceptions 
Most Dooyeweerd scholars agree that he had more than one conception of 
what he calls "the transcendental critique of theoretical thought." They dis-
agree about the number, content, and significance of those conceptions. 
They also face a peculiar complication: Dooyeweerd's New Critique adds 
significant new material to the already lengthy "Prolegomena" that began 
the first volume of De wijsbegeerte der wetsidee. Moreover, the English ver-
sion recasts the material in the Dutch original, and neither clearly distin-
guishes nor smoothly joins the new material and the old. A first-time read-
er lacking access to the Dutch original or to the relevant secondary litera-
ture would not easily detect that Dooyeweerd had changed his mind about 
the scope and motivation of his own project.13 Exacerbating the problem is 
the fact that the two popularized versions of Dooyeweerd philosophy in 
English draw on different phases in his project. Whereas J. M. Spier's 
Introduction, which Meynell cites, stems from a book published in 1938 and 
based on De wijsbegeerte der wetsidee (1935-36)14, L. Kalsbeek's Contours, 
which Meynell does not cite, derives from a book published in 1970 and 
based on A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (1953-58) and other of 
Dooyeweerd's later writingS.IS 
John Kraay suggests that Dooyeweerd had three different conceptions of 
the relation between faith and philosophy, and New Critique contains two of 
them.16 The first of the three, dating from around 1926, gives primacy to the 
"life-and-world view" of the philosopher's religious community. On this 
conception the idea of God's universal law is both the core and the 
"organon" of a Calvinist worldview, to which Dooyeweerd's own philoso-
phy will give expression. The second conception, most prominent in WW 
and other writings from the 1930s, gives primacy to the transcendent 
"Archimedean point" that every philosopher must find. The Archimedean 
point is the "fixed point" that enables a philosopher to form "the idea of the 
totality of meaning [zin-totaliteit]" (NC 1:8, WW 1:10). On this point depends 
every philosophy's "law-idea" or "cosmonomic idea" (wetsidee), which is 
always a "transcendental ground-idea" (wijsgeerige grondidee). The 
Archimedean point chosen by Dooyeweerd's own philosophy resides in 
"the root, reborn in Christ, of the human race, in which we participate via 
[the religious, time-transcending root of our individual personality,] our 
reborn selfhood" (NC 1:99, WW 1:64).17 Dooyeweerd worked out his third 
conception in the 1940s. He consolidated it, interestingly enough, in 
Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought (1948), his first book in English. 
Here primacy goes to "ground-motives" as the dynamic spiritual forces that 
drive not only philosophy but culture as a whole. "Worldview" and 
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"Archimedean point" no longer playa central role in Dooyeweerd's mature 
conception of the relation between faith and philosophy. He argues instead 
that every philosophy must employ three "transcendental ideas" -ideas 
about origin, unity, and coherence-whose direction is set by the dominant 
religious ground-motive in a culture or subculture. According to Kraay, it is 
only with this third conception that Dooyeweerd formulates a "transcenden-
tal critique" in the proper sense. Now transcendental critique replaces the 
"law-idea" or "cosmonomic idea" as the key to Dooyeweerd's philosophy. IS 
Whatever the precise historical details, it is clear that Dooyeweerd has 
more than one conception of the relation between faith and philosophy. 
Indeed, the "Prolegomena" to New Critique (NC 1:1-165; d. WW 1:3-135) pre-
sents two different ways in which to carry out a transcendental critique.'9 
The first way hinges on Dooyeweerd's Archimedean point conception.20 It 
argues from ontological claims about creation, epistemological claims about 
the nature of everyday experience and theoretical thought, and metaphilo-
sophkal claims about philosophy itself to the conclusion that every philoso-
phy requires an "Archimedean point" whose origin cannot itself be solely 
theoretical or philosophical. Rather, every philosophy's Archimedean point 
presupposes a "choice of position" with respect to the II Arche," the origin of 
everything, including philosophy and philosophers themselves (NC 1:11-12, 
WW 1:13-15). This choice can only be made by the entire human being in his 
or her heart. As such the choice, like the Arche, is religious, not merely theo-
retical or philosophical. In this fundamental sense religion makes philosophy 
possible, regardless of the details of a particular philosopher's work.21 
Fully worked out, however, an argument along these lines seems to pre-
suppose what it wishes to conclude. In addition, it neither explains nor 
promotes the possibility of philosophical dialogue across religious bound-
aries. Strictly speaking, it is more a transcendent critique than a transcen-
dental one. Although Dooyeweerd had responses to such criticisms, dissat-
isfaction with his argument led him to develop what the New Critique 
labels as a "second way." From here on I shall understand this second way 
as "Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique."22 Certainly it is most in keeping 
with his own description of a transcendental critique of theoretical thought 
as "a critical inquiry (respecting no single so-called theoretical axiom) into 
the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, and 
which are required by the immanent structure of this thought itself' (NC 1:37).23 
2. Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Critique 
What are the universally valid conditions that make theoretical thought 
possible? Essentially, says Dooyeweerd, there are three. They can be indi-
cated by asking three transcendental questions. First, what makes it possi-
ble for theorists to engage in abstraction from ordinary experience and 
from the structures of creation, which people ordinarily experience in a 
holistic fashion?24 Dooyeweerd's answer lies in the notion of a "Gegenstand-
relation" that is peculiar to theoretical thought and is distinct from an ordi-
nary subject/ object relation.25 His answer goes roughly like this: The only 
way for scientists and philosophers to proceed is to develop careful logical 
definitions and explanations of what they study. To do this, they must 
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exclude many sorts of phenomena from their field of investigation, even 
though the phenomena themselves resist such exclusion. When theorists 
carry out the theoretical process properly, the result is an intentional 
abstraction that neither directly "corresponds" to "reality as such" nor 
arbitrarily imposes a mental construct on the subject matter. 26 In 
Dooyeweerd's own vocabulary, it is unavoidable that, in the act of theoriz-
ing, the logical and nonlogical aspects of thought (and of creation) stand in 
opposition, even though people ordinarily experience no such opposition 
outside theoretical endeavors. 
This gives rise to a second transcendental question: What makes it pos-
sible for theorists to achieve a synthesis between those aspects of experi-
ence and of creation which must stand in opposition when theorizing 
occurs?27 Dooyeweerd's answer to this "problem of inter-modal synthesis" 
has two parts. First, he argues that the required synthesis cannot be 
achieved starting from either side of the unavoidable opposition, either 
from the logical or from the nonlogical side. Such an approach would sim-
ply transpose the original opposition into yet another opposition; the theo-
retical antithesis would not be transcended. Second, he suggests the only 
possibility for such a synthesis lies in the fact that the theorist is more than 
a theorist. The act of theorizing is itself carried out by a unitary agent in 
whom the various aspects of experience and of creation always already 
cohere. This agent cannot be a Cartesian or Kantian cogito: to be able to 
th.ink, the "I" that thinks must be more than its thinking. Kant was right to 
posit the necessity of critical self-reflection for solving the problem of theo-
retical synthesis. But Kant failed to see that the underlying umty provided 
by the human self is "a central and radical unity," and it "transcends" all the 
aspects of experience and creation that theorists can distinguish and under-
stand, including the logical aspect (NC 1:51}.28 Theoretical synthesis neces-
sarily presupposes "a supra-theoretical starting-point which must tran-
scend theoretical diversity" (NC 1:46). 
Now a third transcendental question arises: What makes it possible for 
theorists to engage in such theory-transcending and critical self-reflec-
tion?29 Again Dooyeweerd's answer has two parts. First, the act of theoriz-
ing cannot itself make such self-reflection possible, since the antithetical 
structure of theoretical thought excludes the underlying and rich unity 
needed. Second, what alone can make such self-reflection possible is the 
radical umty of the self itself. Only such a radically umfied self can give 
theoretical thought a "concentric direction" pointing theoretical thought 
beyond itself. Once theoretical thought takes this concentric direction, it 
finds that the self too, despite its radical umty, is nothing in itself. Rather, 
the self is highly dependent on something (or, better, someone) other than 
itself. To put it more explicitly, the self who, among other activities, 
engages in theoretical thought, depends for its own existence on the 
human community to which it belongs and on the "absolute Origin" of 
everything that exists. Since Dooyeweerd considers this relation of depen-
dence to be the core of religion, he can say that the critical self-reflection 
structurally necessary for engaging in theoretical thought is itself made 
possible by the religious nature of being human. By "religion" he means 
"the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself toward the true or 
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toward a pretended absolute Origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, 
which [diversity] it [human selfhood] finds focused concentrically in itself" 
(NC 1:57). As the Dutch text makes clear, religion is a matter of the heart 
and its direction.3D On the heart's direction depends everything human 
beings are and do, including their scientific and philosophical activities. 
Hence the "central significance of the 'heart'" for Dooyeweerd's all-impor-
tant "discovery of the religious root of thought itself' (NC 1:v, WW l:v-vi). 
So Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique of theoretical thought argues 
that every philosophy has a religious root, regardless of its specific stance 
on issues of faith, theology, and traditional topics in philosophy of religion. 
This is so not because every philosopher has consciously and carefully 
decided for or against the God revealed in scripture, creation, and Jesus 
Christ, but because philosophical thought could not even get started if the-
oretical abstraction, theoretical synthesis, and their supra-theoretical tran-
scendence were not possible. In the end, what makes all of this possible is 
the integrity of the human self in relation to its true or supposed origin. 
Were this the end of Dooyeweerd's account, we might think that he has 
not really explained the relation between faith and philosophy. And in one 
very obvious sense Dooyeweerd would agree, for he does not equate faith 
and religion.3l Whereas religion encompasses and connects all of human 
existence with its origin, faith is simply one aspect of human existence along-
side others.32 Religion sets the direction of faith just as much as it sets the 
direction of thought or politics. But faith is no more optional to human exis-
tence than is thought or politics. To trace the relations between faith and phi-
losophy, a follower of Dooyeweerd would need to do at least three things: 
show how, as modes of human existence, both faith and thought stem from 
religion, show how the activities of faith relate to the activities of theoretical 
thought, and show how in a specific sociohistorical setting the content of a 
particular tradition of faith intersects the content of a particular school of phi-
losophy. In recent years, it seems to me, most Christian philosophers 
addressing the relation between faith and philosophy have started with the 
third of these and have only sporadically considered the first and second. 
Dooyeweerd could provide a valuable correction in this respect. 
Here is where Dooyeweerd's much-disputed discussion of "ground-
motives" plays a crucial role. Having made the argument that philosophy 
would not be possible without religion in Dooyeweerd's sense, he propos-
es a detailed account of how religion actually informs philosophical 
thought.33 In brief, he argues that all human communities are driven by 
spiritual dynamic forces working through what he calls "religious ground-
motives."34 Philosophy is no more immune from these spiritual forces than 
is faith or politics. They take shape within philosophy itself by virtue of 
three "transcendental ideas." Not surprisingly, these ideas concern the (1) 
coherence, (2) totality or radical unity, and (3) origin of "all meaning" (NC 
1:69}-Le., of all creation. Taken together, they constitute the "cosmonomic 
idea" (wetsidee) or "transcendental ground-idea" inherent to any philoso-
phy. By calling such ideas "transcendental" DooyE'weerd indicates both 
that philosophy (indeed, all of theoretical thought) cannot avoid having 
such ideas and that the ideas concern whatever sets the conditions for theo-
retical thought yet exceeds its complete grasp. According to his fundamen-
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tal intellectual-historical hypothesis, a significant correlation obtains 
between the actual content of these ideas in philosophy at a certain time 
and the religious ground-motives that drive the communities from which 
particular philosophies arise and to which these philosophies contribute. 
Implicitly following Abraham Kuyper,35 Dooyeweerd says four ground-
motives have been dominant in Western philosophy and culture. The first, 
an outworking of the Holy Spirit, is the motive, central to the Bible, of II cre-
ation, fall, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost" 
(NC 1:61). Two other ground-motives are outworkings of "the spirit of 
apostasy from the true God." They occur as the dialectic of form and mat-
ter ("form-matter motive") that dominates classical Greek culture and phi-
losophy and as the dialectic of nature and freedom ("nature-freedom 
motive") that dominates modem humanist culture and philosophy (NC 
1:61-62). Dooyeweerd describes the fourth ground-motive as follows: 
The scholastic ground-motive of nature and supernatural grace origi-
nates from the attempt to accommodate the Greek form-matter 
motive and the radical biblical ground-motive to each other. In the 
scholastic theology of Thomism it gains its hold on Christian thought; 
it permeates Roman Catholic church doctrine, theology, philosophy 
and sociology. Reformed Protestant thought also, by and large, con-
tinues to be open to the religious influence of the scholastic ground-
motive-as a result it soon loses its reforming impulse.36 
Even without Dooyeweerd's detailed attempts to document the "nature-
grace" ground-motive, his implicitly linking it with apostasy and his 
explicitly rejecting such a synthesis would be enough to set Thomist teeth 
on edge, not to mention traditionalist Calvinists and intellectualist 
Kuyperians. If his intellectual-historical intuitions were approximately 
right, however, this would call for a massive reconstruction of Christian 
philosophy and theology. 
It is only against this backdrop that Dooyeweerd's concern for the 
"inner reformation" of philosophy and all the sciences begins to make 
sense. As Geertsema explains, 
One of the ground-motives determines the content of the cosmonom-
ic idea ... of any given thinker. In this way the religious ground-
motive controls the direction of thought via the transcendental 
ground-idea. The transcendental ground-idea forms the inner point 
of contact between [religion] and science. Inner reformation, then, is 
guided by the biblical ground-motive, which is expressed in the tran-
scendental ground-idea of divine Origin, unity in Christ, ... and 
coherence and diversity within time. In the first place this inner refor-
mation applies to philosophy, but because the various disciplines ... 
necessarily imply a view of diversity in reality and so of unity and 
origin, it also relates to the sciences in general .... 37 
Hence the transcendental critique of theoretical thought provides a way to 
explore the impact of religion on the unavoidable "boundary concepts" of 
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philosophy and science, past and present. It simultaneously serves to 
remind Christian scholars of their spiritual direction on the issues that mat-
ter most. And it does all of this without burying philosophy and science in 
the details of a particular tradition of faith or theology. In that sense, 
Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique accomplishes for scholarship what 
Kuyper accomplished for social policy: to be both umeservedly modem 
and unashamedly Christian. Not surprisingly, the strongest objections 
have come from those who would rather have modernity without 
Christianity or Christianity without modernity. 
3. Religion, Rationality, and Radical Dependence 
"Transcendental Thornists" such as Bernard Lonergan share Dooyeweerd's 
general sense of the challenges facing Christian scholars. They, too, want 
their philosophy to be genuine philosophy, not crypto-theology, even as it 
raises the transcendental questions that hard-bitten secularists might dis-
miss or avoid. So I find it a bit surprising that Hugo Meynell's objections 
draw so heavily on traditional Thomism. In part these objections stem 
from misreadings of Dooyeweerd, encouraged, perhaps, by relying too 
heavily on the simplistic and combative prose of the popularizing pastor J. 
M. Spier, whose book lacks the subtleties of Dooyeweerd's transcendental 
critique. But in part they stem from those intellectual commitments to 
rational autonomy and self-subsistent existence which Dooyeweerd attacks 
in Greek, medieval, and modem philosophy. Rather than give an extensive 
resp':mse to each of Meynell's objections, I shall group them under the 
headings of religion, rationality, and radical dependence. 
3.1 Religion and Fideism 
Meynell's essay suggests in various places that Dooyeweerd is a fideist for 
whom no common basis can exist for dialogue and debate across "ground-
moti ves" and especially between fully Christian and" apostate" philoso-
phy. The flip side to this suggestion is a worry that Dooyeweerd would 
require Christians to avoid the methods and practices of established acade-
mic disciplines such as differential calculus or standard behavioral 
research on the Norway rat. These concerns are misplaced. They can easily 
be alleviated within Dooyeweerd's own conception. Let me explain. 
Dooyeweerd, like Kuyper, has a strong notion of "common grace." 
Thanks to God's providential care, much good occurs in society and culture 
(including philosophy) regardless of the life-direction ("religion" in 
Dooyeweerd's very broad sense) from which a particular product, practice, 
institution, or social pattern arises. It occurs despite the fall, "original sin," 
"total depravity," and all the other obstacles identified in traditional 
Calvinist theology. Accordingly, Dooyeweerd's ground-motive analysis 
gives only part of his assessment of Western philosophy and philosophies. 
He also tries to show that the fundamental structures of God's creation make 
possible philosophy and all other human endeavors and accomplishments. 
These structures the participants both acknowledge and (mis)interpret. A 
Christian faith-commitment gives one no special advantage in that regard, 
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both because all humans are finite and fallible, and because the antithesis 
between good and evil cuts right through humanity and through each 
human heart. Dooyeweerd cannot credit whatever good occurs, whether in 
philosophy or elsewhere, either to the faith-commitment of the practitioner 
or to some shared "rationality" but only to God's common grace, as sus-
tained and carried out through God's laws for creation (" creation" in a broad 
sense that includes human beings, culture, and society). He can say forth-
rightly and from the outset, however, that his criticisms of "immanence-phi-
losophy" are cases of "self-criticism" (NC 1: viii, WW 1: X).38 
Now I admit Dooyeweerd has a more fideist side, especially in his writ-
ings prior to the 1940s, a side stressed by J. M. Spier. But it conflicts with 
the" common grace" side, which allows a more generous understanding of 
culture and welcomes dialogue, debate, and learning across philosophical 
and religious divides. The fideist side alone cannot explain Dooyeweerd's 
battles with the radical fideists in his own theological tradition, both Dutch 
Calvinists and American Presbyterians such as the "presuppositionalist" 
Cornelius V an Til. In any case, Meynell neglects the tension between fideist 
and nonfideist tendencies in Dooyeweerd's own conception. This tension 
has generated considerable creative effort among reformational philoso-
phers, especially at the Free University of Amsterdam and the Institute for 
Christian Studies in Toronto. 
Yet there is one crucial respect in which Dooyeweerd simply cannot be a 
fideist. He does not think that faith, whether as a human capacity or as the 
content of a particular tradition, sets the direction for philosophy and sci-
ence. Religion does, and religion is ontologically and epistemologically 
prior to both faith and scholarship. In this sense, whether or not one makes 
"explicit reference to God or Christ" is beside the point of whether a cer-
tain ground-motive is at work in the transcendental ideas informing one's 
philosophy. Similarly, if Dooyeweerd wishes Christians who philosophize 
to be "Christian all the way down", this cannot mean that he wants them 
to substitute faith talk for philosophy proper. Moreover, he opposes all 
"immanence philosophy" not, first of all, because it "is built up ... inde-
pendently of God and God's revealed Word"39 but because it misunder-
stands the nature of philosophy, denies the dependence of theoretical 
thought on something beyond itself, and finds the locus and origin of 
meaning in creation. 
For such reasons I think it is fundamentally mistaken to say that "for 
Dooyeweerd, as for Barth, belief cannot argue with unbelief, but only 
preach to it." Dooyeweerd's crucial insight is not that human thought 
lacks satisfactory foundations or that "no satisfactory foundations for 
human thought can be set OUt."40 Rather it is his claim that most attempts 
to spell out such foundations miss the actual "foundation" of human 
thought in the human heart and thereby in either the true origin of exis-
tence or some substitute. Dooyeweerd can affirm with Lonergan the 
importance of "attentiveness," "intelligence," and "reasonableness." But 
Dooyeweerd would deny that these provide the sort of foundation which, 
say, Descartes vainly sought. He would also deny that they supersede the 
dependence of even the most attentive, intelligent, and reasonable 
thought on that which transcends thought and makes it possible. 
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3.2 Rationality and Scientism 
All of this has relevance for questions concerning rationality in Meynell's 
essay. At one place, for example, he says: "Apparently Dooyeweerd would 
deny ... that some people can teach others the principles of good reasoning, 
and scientific method in particular, while prescinding from the question of 
whether the Christian faith is true."41 On my own reading, Dooyeweerd 
would not deny that such "faith-neutral" or "faith-detached" teaching and 
learning can occur. The fundamental antithesis does not lie between faiths, 
for faith itself is only one aspect of human life among many. It lies instead 
between comprehensive life-directions-toward God or toward some part 
of creation. Presumably a Christian could be just as tom between these two 
directions as anyone else. Hence the Christian should, in all due humility, 
learn and be ready to learn from others, whatever their faith. 
Dooyeweerd would not point to "rational principles" as the basis or 
enabling conditions for such learning, however, but rather to the laws of 
God's creation and the Holy Spirit's ongoing presence in history, culture, 
society, and human life. Dooyeweerd would also ask why philosophers, 
whatever their faith or purported lack of faith, put so much stock in "ratio-
nal principles." And he would ask whether the account he gives of "ratio-
nality" might not do two things better than other accounts: (1) explain the 
importance of culturally-bound "positivizations" of God's laws in this area 
(e.g., the rules of first-order logic) and (2) explain the inherent limitations, 
fallibility, and cultural variability of such "positivizations."42 For 
Dooyeweerd, "rationality" is a limited but important aspect of human life 
as God has created this. Like all such aspects, rationality is made possible 
by God's laws and sustained by God's Spirit. When exercised by human 
beings in community, rationality is no less susceptible to evil and no less 
open to redemption than any other aspect of human life. The key to such 
renewal, however, does not lie in rationality itself but in how God's Spirit 
works in the hearts of humanity. 
For Dooyeweerd, as for many other non- or anti-foundationalists, two 
questions must arise whenever someone appeals to "rational principles" as 
the basis for dialogue and debate: (1) What counts as rationality? (2) Why 
does such rationality count for so much? Dooyeweerd is by no means an 
irrationalist, of course. He seeks a better basis for rationality, properly 
understood, than that found by the great celebrants of reason such as Kant, 
the obvious primary target of A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Still, 
Dooyeweerd is not primarily interested in grounding Christian apologetics 
or explaining the intrinsic "rationality" of a "Christian position." Rather he 
aims to work out the philosophical implications of a creation-oriented life-
direction that takes seriously both radical evil and God's great sovereignty 
and love. In some ways, his is a very Augustinian project of philosophical 
construction. As Alvin Plantinga suggests, such a constructive approach 
remains "the most difficult" and "in some ways the most important" task 
facing Christian philosophy today.43 
Why, then, would rationality be important on Dooyeweerd's account? 
Because the capacity to analyze, argue, and reach conclusions yields logical 
insight into God's laws and their human outworkings that would other-
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wise be unavailable. Yet logical insight is not the only kind of insight 
human beings need, and it is itself subject to divine laws, as are all other 
aspects of human existence. Does this mean that science, where specialized 
searches for logical insight occur, can only be properly pursued on the 
basis of extra-logical and faith-oriented insights, as Meynell interprets 
Dooyeweerd to be saying? Does Dooyeweerd hold that "all scientific work 
is really committed to a philosophical, and so indirectly to a religious 
stance"?44 Yes and no. Yes, insofar as no academic discipline can avoid 
boundary questions concerning the relationship of its subject matter, meth-
ods, and results to those of other fields. To that extent no academic disci-
pline can do without transcendental ideas concerning origin, unity, and 
coherence of the sort that arise in philosophy and that express religious 
ground-motives (NC 1: 545-66, WW 1: 508-530). Yet this does not imply 
that all scientific work is "really committed" to philosophical and religious 
stances in the sense that scientists themselves must hold specific philo-
sophical theorems or beliefs of faith, either surreptitiously or properly, or 
must let these control the course of investigation.45 With Geertsema, I doubt 
that Dooyeweerd's talk about the "inner reformation of the sciences" 
really meant that the Christian starting-point would change the disci-
plines in the same way that it changed philosophy .... In any case the 
fruitfulness of Dooyeweerd's philosophy ... seems to lie not so much 
in an alternative way of doing science, with its own theories and 
results, as in indicating the limits of science's pretensions and present-
ing a framework in which scientific theories and results can be inter-
preted. This applies both to specific sciences and to science as such.46 
In other words, Dooyeweerd exposes scientism and rejects ontological and 
methodological reductionism, but he does not make the sciences sub-
servient to either faith or philosophy. In this, too, he wishes to be both 
modem and Christian. 
Perhaps the confusion in Meynell's reading here arises from his assum-
ing that "the human subject" is the individual human being rather than a 
transcendental subject. This assumption is suggested by Meynell's talking 
about how "a person's Christian commitment should affect her work as a 
scientist," his asking rhetOrically what part "Paul's Christian faith had in 
his tent-making business," and his wanting to say that there can be "the 
honest seeker" who is not just an "apostate."47 When Meynell says that a 
transcendental Thomist "would strongly agree with Dooyeweerd that the 
human subject is at the base of all philosophy or scientific theory,"48 it is not 
clear that Meynell and Dooyeweerd have the same "subject" in mind. 
Dooyeweerd's "ego" or "heart" or "religious root of human existence" is 
not the existing individual as such. Neither is it a Kantian transcendental 
subject, in the strict sense. It is the central, dynamic, and directed relation-
ship that all human beings sustain, in their entirety, both individually and 
corporately, toward God, toward fellow humans, and toward the rest of 
creation.49 Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique tries to show that the very 
possibility of theoretical thought, and hence of science and philosophy, 
depends upon thought's being subject to God's laws and being oriented 
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either toward the very source of those laws or toward some substitute. 
Accordingly his fundamental questions lie at an altogether different level 
from the question of what difference an individual's faith-commitment 
makes for one's practice of philosophy and science or for the results of 
such practice. Meynell's essay overlooks this difference in level. 
3.3 Radical Dependence 
Dooyeweerd held that his transcendental critique of theoretical thought 
would doubly enhance "the mutual exchange of ideas between the differ-
ent schools of philosophy." First, schools that oppose each other but share 
the same ground-motive could "meet with better mutual understanding" 
once they understood how their opposition stemmed from "the same cen-
tral ground-motive." Second, schools that proceed from different ground-
motives could learn to evaluate their own starting points and begin to 
understand "that fruitful philosophical dialogue can only begin when the 
transcendental problems of philosophical thought as such are critically 
accounted for." The dialogue between his philosophy and neoThomism, 
carried out on this basis, "has led to increasing mutual depth of insight," 
he says. He invites "every school of thought" to be a "partner in this critical 
discussion, which replaces dogmatic defensiveness with mutual critical 
self-reflection, and replaces the hubris of exclusivism with philosophical 
modesty born of insight into the relativity of all philosophical totality 
views." He welcomes them all to the table, not because he is a philosophi-
cal relativist, but because he recognizes how everything, including philoso-
phy, is relative to its origin: "Meaning is the being of all that has been created; it 
is religiously rooted and is of divine Origin."so 
This idea of creation's radical dependence on the Creator marks both 
the continuity and the discontinuity between reformational philosophy 
and transcendental Thomism. Both schools affirm that "reality" is God's 
creation, but they disagree about the implications of their affirmation for 
philosophical categories. Professor Meynell frequently suggests that tradi-
tional categories inherited from Aristotle's metaphysics will do just fine, 
and that even Dooyeweerd implicitly employs such categories. 
Dooyeweerd, by contrast, goes out of his way to show why categories such 
as "being" and "substance" are religiously loaded and philosophically 
problematic. Yet, as Meynell notes, even some of Dooyeweerd's followers 
suggest that his philosophy is more Aristotelian than he admits. 
A key question here, it seems to me, is not whether Dooyeweerd resem-
bles Aristotle, since it is hard to find any major philosopher after Aristotle 
whose thought does not resemble Aristotle's in some respect. One wants to 
know instead whether Dooyeweerd breaks with Aristotle on central ques-
tions of ontology, epistemology, and ethics. I think the answer has to be 
yes, he clearly does. Dooyeweerd's "modal order" implies no hierarchy of 
levels. His "structures of individuality" are functional rather than substan-
tial. His emphasis on creational law and the radical distinction between 
Creator and creature resists any metaphysics of being. And his crilique of 
theoretical thought rejects any privileging of theory, even in the form of 
philosophy or theology. 
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The other key question is why Dooyeweerd's so adamantly opposes 
ideas such as "being" and "substance." Contra Meynell, it is not simply 
because they are "infected by the form-matter religious ground-motive." It 
is certainly not because Dooyeweerd fails to recognize that his discussion 
of the "individuality structures" of "things" addresses what "traditional 
philosophy" has dealt with "under the rubric of 'substance'."51 
Dooyeweerd opposes the idea of "substance" because he finds the notion 
of permanent self-subsistence both untrue to ordinary experience and 
internally antinomous.52 In addition, of course, Dooyeweerd regards this 
category as incompatible with the radical dependence of creation on the 
Creator. Given such charges, it will not do simply to cite Aristotle or 
Thomas as authorities or to claim without adequate backing that on bal-
ance they got things mostly right. Dooyeweerd argues that when it comes 
to understanding plants, animals, human beings, cultural products, and 
social institutions, the substance theories of Aristotle and Thomas get 
things significantly wrong. He also proposes an elaborate alternative theo-
ry of the "structures of individuality,"53 and he shows how his theory is 
compatible with the functional concepts of modern science. In that respect, 
too, I find he has more in common with Lonergan than Meynell's essay 
highlights. 
4. Second Thoughts 
I have tried to show why Dooyeweerd is not a simple fideist, why he con-
siders rationality important, and why he rejects Aristotelian metaphysics. 
Yet I do not want to leave the impression that Meynell's objections lack all 
merit or that Dooyeweerd's philosophy does not warrant criticism. Let me 
mention some problems in Dooyeweerd's conception of transcendental cri-
tique, in order to suggest how one could address them without abandon-
ing his project. The problems pertain to the flawed structure of his argu-
ment and perplexities surrounding his notion of religion. 
4.1 Logical Slippage 
Reduced to its barest outline, Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique of the-
oretical thought goes like this: (1) No one could engage in theoretical 
thought were it not for universally valid conditions that make such 
thought possible. (2) Any philosophy can identify these conditions by ana-
lyzing the structure of theoretical thought itself. (3) Such an analysis shows 
that three universally valid conditions make theoretical thought possible: 
(a) the Gegenstand-relation between logical and nonlogical aspects, (b) the 
supra-theoretical unity of aspects found in the theorizing agent, and (c) the 
agent's radical dependence on something other than itself that makes this 
agent possible. (4) This dependence can only be either on the "absolute 
Origin" of everything that exists or on some substitute that is itself depen-
dent on the "absolute Origin." (5) No system of theoretical thought" can 
avoid employing all-pervasive ideas about the ontological status of the uni-
versally valid conditions that make theoretical thought possible: ideas 
about the coherence, unity, and origin of everything. (6) The most crucial 
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and unavoidable sources for the content of such ideas are supra-theoretical 
and religious ground-motives that grip human beings in their hearts and 
direct them either toward the "absolute Origin" or some substitute. (7) A 
biblical ground-motive is the crucial and unavoidable source for the tran-
scendental ideas guiding this account of how theoretical thought is possi-
ble and how it is necessarily religious in root. (8) The transcendental ideas 
guiding this account concern (a) the temporal and intermodal coherence of 
meaning, (b) the "deeper identity" of the modal aspects of meaning "in a 
religious unity" (NC 1:79), and (c) the divine origin of meaning in its coher-
ence and unity. 
For the sake of argument, let me ignore complications from the New 
Critique's combining two "ways" of transcendental critique, overlook infe-
licities in Dooyeweerd's actual formulations, and assume the soundness of 
each premise. Even with all those concessions in place, I think two sorts of 
logical slippage beset his transcendental critique. In the first place, it seems 
self-referentially incoherent. That is to say, his critique does precisely what 
it declares impossible: it provides a theoretical account of that which sur-
passes the limits of theoretical thought. Given Dooyeweerd's account of 
theoretical thought, his philosophical identification of the supra-theoretical 
unity of aspects and the agent's radical dependence would need to set cer-
tain aspects of this unity and dependence over against the logical aspects of 
thought itself. But if that were done, the unity and dependence could not 
be grasped as supra-theoretical unity and radical dependence. On the other 
hand, if the grasping of unity and dependence were not achieved by 
Dooyeweerd's own theoretical thought but in some supra-theoretical fash-
ion, then this would bode ill for any philosophy that theoretically attempts 
to identify the universally valid conditions for theoretical thought. So 
Dooyeweerd's account of the universally valid conditions for theoretical 
thought seems to subvert the very attempt to give such an account. He tries 
to get around this by saying that "critical self-reflection in the concentric 
direction of theoretical thought to the ego necessarily appeals to self-
knowledge (which goes beyond the limits of the theoretical gegenstand-
relation)" (NC 1:59). But he fails to see that philosophical reflection on such 
critical self-reflection-philosophical reflection such as his transcendental 
critique provides-is not in itself the same as critical self-reflection. The 
question remains whether, on Dooyeweerd's account of theoretical 
thought, such philosophical reflection can be theoretical. If it cannot be the-
oretical, then it cannot be philosophical either. 
The second sort of logical slippage concerns circularity in Dooyeweerd's 
argument. If premises 5-8 are right, then they cannot help but be presup-
posed in premises 1-4. There are specific cases of this. It seems impossible, 
for example, to formulate the notion of the "Gegenstal1d-relation" (3-a) 
without presupposing a temporal and intermodal coherence of meaning 
(8-a). It also seems impossible to conclude that the agent's radical depen-
dence can only be on the "absolute Origin" or a substitute (4) without pre-
supposing the divine origin of meaning (8-c). In some places Dooyeweerd 
even acknowledges such circularity and embraces it. He says, for example, 
that his philosophy's "posing of the transcendental problem is controlled 
from the start by those supra-theoretical presuppositions which are not 
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exposed until the final stage of the transcendental critique."55 Better to have 
one's theory controlled by supra-theoretical presuppositions that "free the-
oretical thought from dogmatic' axioms' standing in the way of a veritable 
critical attitude" and to acknowledge this up front, he says, than to have 
one's theory enslaved to unacknowledged supra-theoretical presupposi-
tions while pretending that it is, and all theory should be, free from such 
presuppositions (NC 1:56). But this rejoinder would be somewhat beside 
the point I am making. To move from premises 1-4 to premises 5-8, it 
seems to me, Dooyeweerd must presuppose the content of his idea of the 
divine origin of meaning (8-c) and import it into his formal claims about the 
agent's radical dependence (3-c) and (4). Otherwise one could grant that 
the agent's radical dependence is required for theoretical thought to be 
possible and still not suppose that the "other" on which it depends is either 
the "absolute Origin" or some "substitute." Since Dooyeweerd's transcen-
dental critique intends to convince other philosophers of the validity of 
that critique, such circularity, while not "vicious," is certainly troublesome 
for Dooyeweerd's own project. 
I do not have the space here to provide adequate repairs to 
Dooyeweerd's argument. It would not suffice to introduce a more "trans-
formational" and less "antithetical" picture of how Christian philosophy 
relates to other schools of thought, although that would help.56 Nor would 
the problems disappear if one took Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique in 
"hermeneutical" directions, although that would help as well.57 Both the 
problem of self-referential incoherence and the problem of circularity stem 
from his (neoKantian) understanding of the limits to theoretical thought. 
What he formulates as "transcendental conditions" are intended to show 
that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient, that it unavoidably depends on 
that which is not itself theoretical. But one can construe this notion of "that 
which is not itself theoretical" in more than one way. It can refer to human 
activities and experiences that are not theoretical, or to topics and objects 
that are not theorized, or to processes and structures that make theoretical 
thought possible. It can also refer to whatever in principle exceeds the grasp 
of theoretical thought. Dooyeweerd combines some of these meanings, so 
that the processes and structures that make theoretical thought possible 
cannot in principle be theoretically grasped, although they can be indicated 
by way of "transcendental ideas." Since his transcendental critique is itself a 
theoretical enterprise, however, made possible by the same "supra-theoreti-
cal" matters, he finds himself in the awkward position of doing in theory 
what his theory of theory says cannot be done. Not even importing "supra-
theoretical" religious content by way of a presupposed "transcendental 
idea" can extricate him from what Hegel would call the dialectic of the 
limit. The only way to salvage some version of Dooyeweerd's transcenden-
tal critique, it seems to me, is to redescribe the structure of theoretical 
thought, recognizing that every theoretical attempt to declare something 
beyond the limits of theory has already surpassed those limits. 
4.2 "Religion" 
An inescapable corollary to such redescription would be thoroughly 
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recasting Dooyeweerd's notion of religion. I do not intend to propose an 
alternative notion here, but simply to indicate why I think one is needed to 
salvage Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique. As I understand 
Dooyeweerd, his notion of religion tries to accommodate three sets of com-
peting considerations. Consequently it embodies tensions between unity 
and diversity, between universality and particularity, and between tran-
scendence and historicity. 
The first tension arises from the necessity of distinguishing religion from 
that which is not religion while holding that religion is all-encompassing. 
On the one hand, Dooyeweerd sees religion is an inescapable and all-
embracing condition of being human. It is not simply a part of human exis-
tence, and it is not something added to the rest of human existence. Rather 
it is all of human existence in its deepest unity and in relationship to the 
(pseudo-)origin of all existence. On the other hand, he cannot avoid using 
language and categories that distinguish religion from that which is not 
religion-philosophy, for example, or science, or art, or politics. Such dis-
tinctions can make it sound as if religion has sufficient independence to 
"express" itself in philosophy or science or art and to "give direction" in 
these affairs. Add to this the complication that Dooyeweerd does not iden-
tify religion with faith, and one begins to wonder what content his notion 
of religion holds. These matters are crucial for Dooyeweerd's transcenden-
tal critique: his entire argument tums on the claim that theoretical thought 
would not be possible if it did not have a "religious root." Indeed, 
Dooyeweerd's own intellectual conversion occurred with "the discovery of 
the rEligious root of thought itself" (NC l:v, WW l:v). 
With respect to the second tension, it is clear that, although 
Dooyeweerd understands religion as an inescapable condition of being 
human, he does not want to leave it at that formal level of universality. He 
sees religion as a matter of life and death, as that on which an individual's 
or a community's destiny hinges. So religion also needs to be something 
each of us experiences--()r, better, each of us is and enacts-in the depths 
of our particular selves. The tension between transcendence and historicity 
arises for similar reasons. On the one hand, Dooyeweerd understands reli-
gion as the directed connection between human beings and God or some 
substitute for God, and he understands God as transcending all of creation. 
On the other hand, he wants to say that such a connection occurs within 
human history. It develops, it takes new turns, it involves a world-histori-
cal battle between good and evil. Otherwise there would be little point to 
identifying "religious ground-motives" and tracing their historical mani-
festations in philosophy and culture. 
When push comes to shove, however, Dooyeweerd's notion of religion 
privileges unity, universality, and transcendence over diversity, particulari-
ty, and historical phenomena. And this unitary, universal, and transcendent 
thrust results in a type of mysticism that reinforces the logical slippage I have 
already identified.58 The reinforcement comes when Dooyeweerd describes 
the human heart, the religious root of human existence, as "supra-temporal." 
This makes religion "supra-theoretical," even though religion is at the core of 
human existence. Consequently, what is most central to being human, and 
what unifies all we are and do, cannot be grasped philosophically, theologi-
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cally, sociologically, or in any other theoretical way. But Dooyeweerd's tran-
scendental argument cannot afford to declare religion off limits for theoreti-
cal inquiry. Nor does his own practice of identifying and tracing religious 
ground-motives support such a view of religion, even though he assigns 
minimal content to these dynamic spiritual forces as such. Dooyeweerd 
leaves us with a perplexing, internally conflicted notion of religion that nev-
ertheless serves as the pivot to his transcendental critique. 
Any attempt to salvage Dooyeweerd's project must address both the 
logical slippage in his transcendental argument and the conceptual confu-
sion in his account of religion. A brief comparison of the two books that do 
most to rearticulate Dooyeweerd's philosophy for a North American audi-
ence will bear this out. In Understanding Our World, Hendrik Hart reserves 
discussion of the issues raised by Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique for 
what he titles" Appendix: A Concluding Prescientific Postscript."59 There 
Hart avoids the problems in Dooyeweerd's argument by abandoning the 
idea that either the transcendental relation between theory and religion or 
the specific version of that relation in a Christian philosophy can be suc-
cessfully argued. In this way Dooyeweerd's theoretical prolegomenon to 
reformational philosophy threatens to become a personal faith-professing 
postlude, as I have shown elsewhere.60 Hart retains Dooyeweerd's tran-
scendental impetus without the critique. 
Roy Clouser's The Myth of Religious Neutrality, by contrast, begins with 
the claim that everyone has "religious beliefs" in something that has "the 
status of not depending on anything else" or of being "self-existent."61 
From there Clouser needs only a few steps to conclude that every compre-
hensive theory, whether philosophical or scientific, is controlled by the 
contents of the religious belief it presupposes. And because of the abstrac-
tive character of theorizing, any theorist who takes something other than 
the God revealed in Scripture to be the self-existent being on which every-
thing else depends must make claims that are "self-performatively incoher-
ent."62 So Clouser avoids the problems in Dooyeweerd's argument by turn-
ing it into what Dooyeweerd would call a "theolOgically-transcendent cri-
tique," one which "subjects the different results of philosophical thought to 
the test of Holy Scripture or of a church dogma that is thought to be infalli-
ble."63 Not surprisingly, Clouser says his book "is addressed to those who 
believe in God" and does not try to win "unbelievers" to his point of 
view.64 He retains Dooyeweerd's critical impetus without the transcenden-
tal argument. 
The difference between Hart's and Clouser's appropriation of 
Dooyeweerd transcendental critique-personal confession on the one 
hand, dogmatic criticism on the other-strikingly illustrates two ways to 
avoid addressing the problems in Dooyeweerd's argument.65 Neither way 
addresses the dialectic of the limits to theoretical thought. Moreover, Hart 
and Clouser's fundamentally opposed accounts of religion, which empha-
size different sides to the notion of religion in New Critique, do not provide 
convincing alternatives to Dooyeweerd's own account. Although Professor 
Meynell does not discuss either Clouser or Hart, he has identified puzzles 
in Dooyeweerd's bold project that neither adequately addresses. These 
puzzles merit the attention of anyone who thinks seriously about the rela-
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tion between faith and philosophy. lhey remain generative challenges for 
the tradition of reformational philosophy that Dooyeweerd helped create.66 
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philosophy department in 1951, legendary battles began between the 
"Jellemanians" and the "Dooyeweerdians." Runner was a graduate of both 
Westminster Theological Seminary and the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam 
who wrote his dissertation under Vollenhoven's supervision. He soon became 
the leading North American proponent of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven's 
philosophy and a founder of the Institute for Christian Studies (ICS) in 
Toronto, a graduate school for interdisciplinary philosophy and theology 
established in 1967. Most of the original faculty at ICS had studied with 
Runner at Calvin College and received their graduate training at the Vrije 
Universiteit. By contrast, several founders of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers were students of Jellema or of Jellema's own students, including 
Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Kenneth Konyndyk. Although I 
never studied at Calvin College, I taught there from 1985-2002 and enjoyed 
excellent collegial relations with the "Jellemanians." My own graduate training 
came at the Vrije Universiteit and the Institute for Christian Studies, where I 
took up a position as Professor of Philosophy in 2002. 
7. Published in the journal Studien. Tijdschrift voor godsdienst, wetenschap en 
letteren 67 (1935): 85-99; 68 (1936): 153-53; and 69 (1937): 324-31. For summaries 
of Dutch Thomist criticisms of Dooyeweerd and his responses to them, see 
Yong Joon Choi, Dialogue and Antithesis: A Philosophical Study on the Significance 
of Herman Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Critique (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Potchefstroom University, South Africa, 2000), pp. 50-51, 86-97. Readers of 
Dutch should also consult H. G. Geertsema, "Dooyeweerd in discussie met de 
rooms-katholieke filosofie" [Dooyeweerd in Discussion with Roman Catholic 
Philosophy], in Herman Dooyeweerd 1894-1977: Breedte en actualiteit van zijn 
filosofie, ed. H. G. Geertsema et a1. (Kampen: Kok, 1994), pp. 228-54. 
8. Michael Fr. J. Marlet S. J., Grundlinien der kalvinistischen "Philosophie der 
Gesetzesidee" als christlicher Transzendentalphilosophie [Basic Outlines of the 
Calvinistic "Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea" as Christian Transcendental 
Philosophy] (Munich: Karl Zink, 1954). Dooyeweerd's "Zum Geleit" appears 
on pp. v-vii. 
9. Choi, Dialogue and Antithesis, pp. 91-92. See also the objections of the 
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Dutch Calvinist Aquinas scholar J. A. Aertsen, who argues "that Dooyeweerd 
interprets Aquinas too exclusively from the perspective of Aristotle and too lit-
tle as a Christian thinker" (Choi, p. 93). 
10 Like Calvin Seerveld, who coined the term from the Dutch "reforma-
torisch," I use "reformational" to include Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven and 
those scholars who both build on their work and identify themselves as partici-
pants in the Kuyperian tradition of Calvinist Christianity. See Craig 
Bartholomew and Gideon Strauss, "Bread and not Stones: An Introduction to 
the Thought of Calvin Seerveld," In the Fields of the Lord: A Seerveld Reader, ed. 
Craig Bartholomew (Carlisle, UK: Piquant; Toronto: Toronto Tuppence Press, 
2000), pp. 3-22, especially p. 3, n. 1. Reformational scholars have produced a 
large body of secondary literature on Dooyeweerd, in both Dutch and English. 
In chronological order, representative anthologies (some cited above) include 
Philosophy and Christianity: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Professor Dr. Herman 
Dooyeweerd, ed. W. F. De Gaay Fortman et a1. (Kampen: Kok; Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing, 1965); The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (1985); 
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important source for "in-house" debates on these issues. Since the 1980s the 
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11. By "theoretical thought" Dooyeweerd means the sort of abstractive 
thinking that characterizes philosophy and the sciences. He uses the term "sci-
ence" in the broad sense that attaches to "wetenschap" in Dutch and 
"Wis~,enschaft" in German. It encompasses all the academic disciplines, includ-
ing mathematics, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. 
12. See David H. Freeman, "A Comparative Study of the Relationship 
betw{>en Philosophy and Theology as Exemplified by Representatives of Neo-
Augustinianism, Neo-Thomism, and Neo-Existentialism" (Ph. D. Diss., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1958); Anna Louize Conradie, The Neo-Calvinistic 
Concept of Philosophy: A Study in the Problem of Philosophic Communication (Natal, 
South Africa: Natal University Press, 1960); and Vincent Briimmer, 
Transt:endental Criticism and Christian Philosophy: A Prese1ltation and Evaluation of 
Herm,ln Dooyeweerd's "Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea" (Franeker: Wever, 
1961). Both Conradie and Briimmer hailed from South Africa. Their interest 
probably stemmed from Dooyeweerd's substantial debates, dating from the 
1930s, with the South African Calvinist philosopher Hendrik Stoker, himself a 
former student of the German phenomenologist Max Scileler. 
13. The fact that the authors of the only general English-language introduc-
tions to Dooyeweerd's thought were not scholars, and certainly not profession-
al philosophers, has not helped the academic reception of Dooyeweerd's 
thought in North America. a. M. Spier was a pastor, and L. Kalsbeek was a 
school teacher-see the next two notes for details about their books.) Nor has it 
helped that these introductions are translations of Dutch popularizations. Of 
the two options, Kalsbeek's book is the more nuanced and has the more ade-
quate scholarly apparatus, thanks largely to the work of the editors and the 
"Glossary of Terms" provided by Albert M. Wolters (an adapted version, titled 
"Glossary," appears in The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd, pp. 167-71.) 
14. J. M. Spier An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, trans. David Freeman 
(Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1954). A second English 
edition appeared with Craig Press in 1966 but did little to update the text in 
light of Dooyeweerd's later writings. Spier tells us in his "Author's Preface" (p. 
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translation of his "fourth revised Dutch edition published in 1950" (i.e., a few 
years before the publication of NC 1). The Dutch original was titled Een inleid-
ing tot de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee [An Introduction to the Philosophy of the 
Law-Idea] (Zutphen: G. J. A. Ruys, 1938). Like the fourth edition, the second 
and third editions were published by J. H. Kok (Kampen}--in 1940 and 1946, 
respectively. 
15. L. Kalsbeek, Contours of a Christian Philosophy: An Introduction to Herman 
Dooyeweerd's Thought, ed. Bernard and Josina Zylstra (Toronto: Wedge 
Publishing Foundation, 1975). The Dutch original was De wijsbegeerte der wet-
sidee: Proeve van een christelijke filosofie [The Philosophy of the Cosmonomic 
Idea: Sample of a Christian Philosophy] (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 
1970). 
16. John N. Kraay, "Successive Conceptions in the Development of the 
Christian Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd," Philosophia Reformata 44 (1979): 
137-49 and 55 (1980): 1-40. Kraay labels these (1) the organon conception, (2) 
the Arcmmedean point conception, and (3) the groundmotive conception. 
17. The Archiffiedean point is distinct from the "Arche." The Arche is what 
a philosophy takes as the origin of everything. For Dooyeweerd's philosophy, 
God is the Arche on whom all creatures, including "reborn humanity," depend, 
and to whom they all refer. Religion is the fundamental relation, via humanity, 
between creation and either its divine origin or some creaturely substitute. He 
succinctly summarizes this ontology as follows: "Meaning [zin] is the being [zijn] 
of all creaturcly beings [creatuurlijk zijnde], the mode-of-being [zijnswijze] of our 
selfhood too-religious in root, and divine in origin" (NC 1:4, WW 1:6). 
18. Kraay, "Successive Conceptions," Philosophia Reformata 55 (1980): 35. 
19. This is not transparent from the headings, however. The Introduction to 
the "Prolegomena" carries the subtitle "The First Way of a Transcendental 
Critique of Philosophic Thought" (NC 1:3, emphases added). Only in the subtitle 
to section 2 of chapter 1 does one find mention of a "second way," and then it 
is called "The Second Way to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophy (NC 1:34, 
emphases added). Nothing of substance depends on the shift from "of" to "to" 
or from "critique" to "criticism" or from "philosophic thought" to "philoso-
phy." One does hope, however, that such terminological slippage disappears 
in the new edition from the Dooyeweerd Centre at Redeemer University 
College in Ancaster, Ontario. The Dooyeweerd Centre is producing "The 
Collected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd" in English. For more details, see the 
web site <http://www.redeemer.on.ca/Dooyeweerd-Centre/dooyew.htm>. 
20. This is the only way presented in the Dutch text (WW 1:5-33), where the 
heading does not label it a "transcendental critique." 
21. See in this connection Robert D. Knudsen, "The Religious Foundation 
of Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Method," in Contemporary Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, pp. 271-85. Knudsen explains that religion in 
Dooyeweerd's sense "cannot be fixed directly in one's gaze" but "can be dis-
cerned only in depth, by ... reflecting on what is already present and is exert-
ing influence on what one is doing. It is what Dooyeweerd calls 'the hidden 
player' behind all thought" (p. 274). In a footnote Knudsen explains that the 
"hidden player" metaphor comes from the practice in some Dutch churches of 
hiding the organ console behind a screen; one hears the organ music but does 
not see the organist at work. I am reminded here of Walter Benjamin's allegory 
for the preferred relation between "theology" and "historical materialism" in 
"Theses on the Philosophy of History," Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, 
trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 253. I should add, 
however, that Knudsen's account of "transcendental method" is too broad to 
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capture Dooyeweerd's mature conception of transcendental critique. 
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the so-called "second way" can count. Henk Geertsema replies that 
Dooyeweerd's application of the term "transcendental critique" to his earlier 
and so-called first way is in keeping with the deepest motivations of 
Dooyeweerd's life work. See Geertsema, "Dooyeweerd's Transcendental 
Critique: Transforming It Hermeneutically," in Contemporary Reflections, 83-
108. I think Hommes' argument verges on the pedantic, but Geertsema's reply 
lets Dooyeweerd off too easily. 
23. For similar formulations by Dooyeweerd, see "Christian Philosophy: 
An Exploration," p. 4; and In the Twilight, p. 4. The continuity of his transcen-
dental critique with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is most apparent from 
Dooyeweerd's formulation in Transcendental Problems, p. 19: "How is philosophy 
in the theoretical sense ... possible, that is to say, under what universal and neces-
sary conditions? This problem is of a radical-critical character. It implies the 
question in respect to the possibility of scientific thought in all its forms .... It 
touches the necessary pre-supposita of all theoretical thought whatsoever." 
24. In Dooyeweerd's own technical vocabulary, this question reads: "What 
do we abstract in the antithetic attitude of theoretic thought from the structures of 
empirical reality as these structures are given in naive experience? And how is this 
abstraction possible?" (NC 1:41) Or, more simply, "what do we abstract in the inten-
tional antithetic thought-relation from the integral structure of the horizon of our expe-
rience" and how is this abstraction possible? ("Christian Philosophy," p. 11) 
25. Perhaps no other topic has drawn such sophisticated criticism from 
reformational philosophers as Dooyeweerd's account of the "Gegenstand-rela-
tion." See especially D.F.M. Strauss, "An Analysis of the Structure of Analysis," 
Philosophia Reformata 49 (1984): 35-56, and Hendrik Hart, "Dooyeweerd's 
Gegenstand Theory of Theory," in The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd, 143-66. As 
Geertsema suggests in his summary and response to Strauss's criticisms, so 
much in Dooyeweerd's mature conception depends on his account of the 
Gegenstand-relation that eliminating it would knock out the scaffolding for his 
transcendental critique. See Geertsema, "Dooyeweerd's Transcendental 
Critique," pp. 86-91. 
26. Although I cannot elaborate the point here, Dooyeweerd's account of 
theoretical thought successfully sidestepped the debate between epistemologi-
cal realists and epistemological anti-realists long before it became a preoccupa-
tion of protestant Christian philosophers in North America. 
27. "From what standpoint can we reunite synthetically the logical and the non-
logical aspects of experience which were set apart in opposition to each other in the the-
oretical antithesis?" (NC 1: 45) Or, "from what standpoint can the aspects of our hori-
zon of experience, which were set apart and in opposition to each other in the theoretical 
antithesis, be reunited in a theoretical synthesis?" ("Christian Philosophy," p. 14) 
28. Cf. "Christian Philosophy," p. 17. 
29. "How is this critical self-reflection, this concentric direction of theoretical 
thought to the I-ness, possible, and what is its true character?" (NC 1:52) Or, "how is 
this critical self-reflection, this concentric direction of theoretical thought toward the 
self, possible, and what is its origin?" ("Christian Philosophy," p. 18) 
30. "The heart is the fullness of our selfhood, the genuinely transcendent 
focal point [concentratiepunt] of our existence. In the heart all temporal mean-
ing-functions [zin-ftl11cties] come together. As such the heart is also the neces-
sary point of departure for philosophical thought. This point of departure truly 
cannot be eliminated, since our selfhood is intellectually at work [denkende 
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werkzaam] in every theoretical abstraction. And the fullness of our selfhood 
consists solely in the religious center of our creaturely existence, where the direc-
tion for all of life is set lbepaald wordt] with respect to the completely true and 
absolute origin of everything. As Christ has said: Where your treasure is, there 
will your heart be also" (WW 1:30-31, my translation; this passage does not 
seem to have an equivalent in NC). 
31. For an explicit and nuanced account of the difference and relationship 
between faith and religion, see NC 2: 298-330, WW 2: 227-59. For the relevance 
of this to Dooyeweerd's understanding of the relation between theology and 
philosophy, see In the Twilight, pp. 113-72. 
32. there is, to be sure, a special role for faith and a special connection 
between faith and religion, as James H. Olthuis indicates in "Dooyeweerd on 
Religion and Faith," The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd, pp. 21-40. He summa-
rizes Dooyeweerd's view as follows: "First, spirituality-being religious-is as 
broad as life itself .... [R]eligion is a way of life that people engage in with their 
full existence and at all times .... Second, faith is one of the fundamental modes 
of being religious: a sui generis mode of human experience, belonging to the 
order of creation, in which the intrinsic spirituality of all of life receives explicit 
and concentrated focus" (p. 21). 
33. For an exceptionally clear and succinct statement of the transition from 
Dooyeweerd's three transcendental questions to his account of religious 
ground-motives and the three transcendental ideas, see "Christian 
Philosophy," pp. 22-23, 35-37. 
34. "Now a religious community is maintained by a common spirit, which 
as a dynamis, as a central motive-power, is active in the concentration-point of 
human existence. 1his spirit ... works through a religious ground-motive, which 
gives contents to the central mainspring of the entire attitude of life and 
thought" (NC 1:61). 
35. Kuyper distinguishes five "life systems": Paganism, Islamism, 
Romanism, Modernism, and Calvinism. See Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on 
Calvinism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1975, c1931), pp. 19-40. 
36. "Christian Philosophy," p. 29. 
37. Henk G. Geertsema, "The Inner Reformation of Philosophy and 
Science," in Christian Philosophy at the Close of the Twentieth Century, p. 15. 
38. The Dutch passage from 1935 is more poignant than the English ren-
dering from 1953, so let me attempt my own translation: "Indeed, a smug sci-
entific stance toward immanence-philosophy hardly meshes with a Christian 
view of science and a Christian epistemic posture [kennishouding]. One has not 
grasped the intentions of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea if one does 
not understand that [my] detailed critique of humanist immanence-philosophy 
. .. is essentially meant as self-critique, as a case the Christian thinker pursues 
with himself. I would not judge so pointedly about immanence-philosophy had 
I not been there myself, had I not jointly and personally experienced its prob-
lematic [haar problematiek mede persoonlijk heb ervaren]. And I would not pass 
such a trenchant judgment about attempts at synthesis between this philoso-
phy and Christian truths of faith, had I not undergone the inner tension 
between both myself and [had I not] personally struggled through these 
attempts" (WW l:x). 
39. Meynell, "The Philosophy of Dooyeweerd," pp. 266-67. 
40. Meynell, p. 268. 
41. Meynell, p. 271. 
42. I should note, however, that the later Dooyeweerd's worries about "his-
toricism" complicate the question of rationality'S cultural variability. 
43. Alvin Plantinga, "Christian Philosophy at the End of the 20th Century," 
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in Christian Philosophy at the Close of the Twentieth Century, p. 45. Plantinga's 
essay originated as an address to the 1994 international symposium organized 
by the Association for Calvinist Philosophy in the Netherlands to mark the 
centennial of Dooyeweerd's birth. The essay distinguishes four divisions or 
tasks of Christian philosophy: "negative and positive apologetics," "philosoph-
ical theology," "Christian philosophical criticism," and "constructive Christian 
philosophy." 
44. Meynell, p. 270. 
45. The vocabulary of "control beliefs" in Nicholas Wolterstorffs Religion 
within the Bounds o.f Reason (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976) does not do 
justice to the complexity of relationships between religion, philosophy, and sci-
ence, it seems to me. Nor does the model proposed by Brian J. Walsh and J. 
Richard Middleton, increasingly popular among Evangelical scholars, accord-
ing to which "religious world views" shape "philosophical paradigms" that 
shape various academic disciplines in tum. See their book The Transforming 
Vision: Shaping a Christian World View (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 
1984), pp. 163-86. 
46. Geertsema, "The Inner Reformation of Philosophy and Science," pp. 
17-18. 
47. Meynell, pp. 270-72. 
48. Meynell, p. 272. 
49. Perhaps we can say that the transcendental function of the "ego" or 
"heart" in Dooyeweerd's account resembles that of the Kantian subject, even 
though its content differs dramatically. 
50. Dooyeweerd, "Christian Philosophy," pp. 36-37. 
51. Meynell, p. 278. 
52. See especially NC 3: 3-29, WW 3:1-10, where Dooyeweerd describes the 
metaphysical concept of substance as "a speculative exaggeration of a datum 
of naIve experience." 
53. Jonathan Chaplin sorts out the strengths and weaknesses of 
Dooyeweerd's social tFteory in "Dooyeweerd's Notion of Societal Structural 
Principles," Philosaphia Reformata (1995): 16-36. I assess Dooyeweerd's cultural 
theory in the same journal issue, under the title "Fantastic Things: Critical 
Notes toward a Social Ontology of the Arts" (pp.37-54). 
54. More carefully, perhaps one should say "no philosophy and (by exten-
sion) no science insofar as its boundary questions are philosophical." 
55. "Christian Philosophy," p. 23. 
56. Here I have in mind several instructive essays by Jacob Klapwijk: "The 
Struggle for a Christian Philosophy: Another Look at Dooyeweerd," The 
Reformed Journal 30 (February 1980) 2: 2-15; "Dooyeweerd's Christian 
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101-134. 
57. In addition to the two essays by Geertsema cited earlier, see Hendrik G. 
Geertsema, "Christian Philosophy: Transformation or Inner Reformation," 
Philosophia Reformata 52 (1987): 139-65. 
58. Although I restrict my criticisms to the role Dooyeweerd's conception 
of religion plays in his transcendental critique, I agree with other critics that 
additional problems are even more pressing, such as a lack of messianic per-
spective, a muteness with respect to suffering and oppression, and an inability 
to recognize how religion, even in its most fundamental and central sense, is 
mediated by the practices, institutions, and structures of finite and fallible 
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alternative, see "Earth's Lament: Suffering, Hope, and Wisdom," an inaugural 
address given on November 21, 2003. The text is available online at 
<http://www.icscanada.edu/ events / convocation/ >. 
59. Hendrik Hart, Understanding Our World: An Integral Ontology (Lanham, 
Md.: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 325-70. 
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later developments in Hart's account of religion and rationality in "Artistic 
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63. Dooyeweerd, "Christian Philosophy," p. 4; d. NC 1: 37-38. Both pas-
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64. Clouser, p. 5. 
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